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CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
CRIMINAL LAW - CONFESSIONS -
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
United States v. Davis, 259 F. Supp. 496
(D. Mass. 1966).
A plain reading of Miranda v. Arizona1 demands that its hold-
ing be applied beyond the precise facts found in the case and used
to delineate a procedural code which will guide police and courts
in the use of a defendant's pre-trial admissions against interest2 If
this code is not to be emasculated as were the ones announced in
Escobedo v. Illinois3 and McNabb v. United States,4 then it must
not be limited to the precise facts of police-station custody presented
in Miranda and the three companion cases which were reversed for
lack of warnings.5 Applying an exclusionary rule based upon the
fifth and sixth amendments, the United States Supreme Court said:
[Tihe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpa-
tory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.'
By this language the Court obviously did not mean to limit
"custodial interrogation!' to interrogation-room questioning but to
1384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
"Admissions against interese' is the preferred term because the court in Miranda
stresses that no distinction shall be made between inculpatory and exculpatory state-
ments. Id. at 477.
a 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The case holds that when the interrogation process be-
comes accusatory and its purpose is to elicit a confession, the accused must be permitted
to consult with his lawyer. For restrictive interpretations, see United States v. Cone,
354 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1965); People v. Hartgraves, 31 IMI. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33,
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); State
v. Howard, 383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 852, 205 N.E.-
2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965); State v. Pucket, 201 N.E.2d 86 (C.P. Ohio 1964).
See generally Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogations,
25 Oo ST. L.J. 449, 494 (1964). See also Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79
HARV. L. R1Ev. 21, 31 (1965).
4 318 U.S. 332 (1943). For restrictive interpretations, see cases collected in Hogan
& Smee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. LJ. 1,
6 (1958). See, e.g., Metoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 30 (DC. Cir. 1957); United
States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 671 (7th Cir. 1943).
5 Miranda v. Arizona and the three cases decided with it, Vignera v. New York,
Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart, all dealt with interrogation at the
police station.
6 384 U.S. at 444. 'This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an in-
vestigation which had focused on an accused." Id. at 444 n.4.
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impose constitutional limitations upon all questioning of persons
who have been placed in a compelling atmosphere by being de-
prived of their freedom of action in any significant way7
The recent decision in United States v. Davis' ignored Miran-
da's broad application and limited its definition of custodial inter-
rogation. The court upheld the admissibility of incriminating state-
ments made by the defendant while he was being questioned by
customs officers even though he had not been warned of his rights
to silence and counsel.'
Defendant Davis was a citizen and a crew member on a United
States ship re-entering the country. Customs officers boarded the
ship to make a routine search for contraband1 ° and found two en-
velopes containing marijuana in an overhead vent. Later the cus-
toms officers searched the defendant's cabin in his presence and
found a marijuana cigarette in his locker. While the officers con-
tinued their search, the defendant asked permission to go to the
bathroom. He was first searched, then allowed to go, but only un-
der escort by a customs officer. Further search, with the defendant
present, revealed a package of marijuana cigarettes. The officers
questioned the defendant as to where he had purchased the cigar-
ettes and were told that he had bought them in Mexico. The de-
tention and questioning lasted approximately an hour and a quarter,
after which the defendant was told that he was free to move about
the ship but not to leave." The customs officers left the ship, pro-
cured an arrest warrant, and returned, going straight to the defend-
ant's cabin. Without showing their arrest warrant, they asked him
if he had paid tax on the marijuana. He replied that he had not
and was told that he was under arrest for violation of the narcotics
7 Cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), where a paroled prisoner's lib-
erty was held to have been sufficiently restrained to find him "in custody" within the
meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute, even though he was free to come and go
as he pleased or change residences, subject to his parole officer's consent.
8 259 F. Supp. 496 (D. Mass. 1966).
9 The cautionary warnings required by Miranda are: "He must be warned prior to
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any ques-
tioning." 384 U.S. at 479.
10 The search was authorized by 14 Stat. 178 (1866), 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964); 46
Stat. 747 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1964); 46 Stat 748 (1930), 19
U.S.C. § 1582 (1964).
11 For the Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar fact situation, see Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). For a discussion of the case see note 7 supra.
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laws of the United States. 2 At this point, after having obtained
all necessary admissions, the officers told the defendant that any-
thing he said could be used against him and that he had the right
to retain counsel. 3
The court refused to hold that the delay in advising the de-
fendant of his rights to silence and counsel required the sustaining
of a motion to suppress the admissions against interest. Although
the court conceded that Davis had been "under detention' during
his questioning, 4 it refused to find that he had been "deprived of
his action in a significant way" so as to call for the application of
the exclusionary rule announced in Miranda." This reasoning con-
fines Miranda to its precise fact situation despite the Supreme
Court's broad statement that "There can be no doubt that the fifth
amendment serves... to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed from being compelled to incrim-
inate themselves."'" It seems obvious that a compelling atmos-
phere is present whether the setting is in a police interrogation
room or on a ship. It is not the physical location that is important
but rather the detention. Therefore, it is submitted that "custodial
interrogation" was improperly limited by the court in United States
v. Davis.
There are two approaches that the courts might take in the fu-
ture to determine the existence of custodial interrogation - they
might employ either an objective or a subjective standard.' The
objective test would look to the police officer's testimony relating
to his intention to make an arrest, plus the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation. This would indicate whether a suspect in
such a setting would feel that he was in custody and therefore com-
pelled to answer questions. The subjective test would look further
and consider the individual suspect's personality, that is, whether
a person having his background and character traits would feel he
was in custody and compelled by the setting to answer questions.
The New York courts have applied the objective test to deter-
12 68A Stat. 563 (1954), 26 U.S.C. § 4751 (1964); 68A Stat. 564 (1954), 26
U.S.C. § 4753 (1964); 68A Stat. 565 (1954), 26 U.S.C. § 4755 (1964).
Is 259 E. Supp. at 497.
4 Ibd.
15Id. at 498.
10 384 U.S. at 467. (Emphasis added.)
17 This wziter's denotation of "subjective' and "objective" should not be confused
with those of Judge Sobel in People v. Allen, 50 Misc. 2d 897, 905, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249,
256-57 (Sup. Ct .1966).
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mine the existence of custodial interrogation and have looked to
whether the suspect was free to go during questioning by police.'8
If he was not, then the four-fold warning of Miranda must have
been given if the suspect's statements are to be admissible. In Peo-
ple v. Reason 9 the court held that the questioning of two burglary
suspects on the street was custodial interrogation when three offi-
cers formed a circle around the suspects, and one officer testified
that he would have restrained the suspects had they tried to move
away.2" In People v. Allen,2 statements given to a police officer
in the suspect's home without prior warnings were held inadmis-
sible on the basis of the police officer's testimony that he went to
the suspect's home to apprehend him and that the suspect would
not have been free to leave voluntarily.22 The court in Allen in-
terpreted Miranda to require warnings before questioning a suspect
"so long as the defendant was not at such time free to go."2
Inclusion of a subjective test seems necessary to meet many sit-
uations. For example, the police may not intend to arrest a man
when they question him, so that their testimony will not show an
intent to detain; nevertheless, the suspect may be subjectively aware
of a compelling atmosphere. 4 Thus, the individual suspect's back-
ground must be considered to determine his susceptibility to the
pressure of police presence. This is a necessary part of applying
Miranda, since the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the subjective
basis of the fifth amendment privilege in Davis v. North Carolina,25
a post-Miranda case. Davis tends to show that the fifth amend-
ment privilege is personal to the defendant and is not grounded
solely in deterring offensive police practices.2" This necessitates
looking to the individual defendant to determine whether the lack
18 See id. at 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
19 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
20 Id. at 199.
2150 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
22Id. at 899-900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52.
28 Id. at 900, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
24 See Judge Sobel, commenting in ibid., that this will be the more difficult and re-
curring situation. Cf. Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953), where
statements made by the defendant to police permitting them to search his house were
held not to constitute consent because the defendant had probable cause to consider him-
self under duress or arrest at the time he made the statements.
25 384 U.S. 737 (1966); see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Rogers
v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
26 See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See also Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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of warnings would tend to make him subjectively aware of a com-
pelling atmosphere."
In United States v. Davis, the court could have found custodial
interrogation from the objective factor of an hour and a quarter of
questioning accompanied by detention during which the suspect was
not even free to go to the bathroom without a police escort. The
defendant's subjective awareness of compelling circumstances would
require an inquiry which was not shown in the record as to defend-
ant's individual traits.
The Davis court's strict construction of custodial interrogation
can be understood after reading its cursory consideration of pre-
Miranda interrogation rules. In a brief paragraph the court states
that prior to Miranda no federal or common law rule required ex-
clusion of a suspect's statement taken without warnings2 8 The
court cited two early cases to support its holding: Powers v. United
States 9 and Wilson v. United States."0  Thus, the court ignored
Haynes v. Washington8' which made the absence of warnings a
factor to consider,"2 and turned its back on the controversy in the
courts over the meaning of Escobedo.8 It rejected what one dis-
tinguished legal writer had said was the narrowest construction pos-
sible of Escobedo v. Illinois: "At the very least, Escobedo ... over-
rules, sub silentio, Powers v. United States and Wilson v. United
States." 4  This slight examination of the pre-Miranda area of po-
lice interrogations further weakens the Davis court's analysis of
Miranda.
One line of reasoning which the court did not follow, but which
might be tried in future cases involving questioning by customs offi-
cers, is to analogize custodial interrogation to "border searches."
2 7 See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961); cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
28259 F. Supp. at 498.
29 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
80 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
81373 U.S. 503 (1963).
821d. at 516-17.
8 8 Compare People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169
(1965), with People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.Y2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924
(1965). See also People v. Hartgraves, 31 I1. 2d 375, 202 N.X.2d 33, cort. denied,
380 U.S. 961 (1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); State v. Howard,
383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964).
84 Herman, supra note 3, at 475 n.154.
85 See generally 18 W. REs. L REV. 1007 (1967). Border searches may be made
upon mere suspicion according to statute. 14 Stat. 178 (1866), 19 U.S.C. § 482
(1964).
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A long line of cases has established a rule allowing customs offi-
cers far wider discretion in search and seizure procedures than is
allowed any other state or federal police agency." This has never
been extended to questioning procedures, but it could easily be at-
tempted in a case such as Davis. The reason, however, for elasti-
cizing the fourth amendment during border searches is absent in
cases concerning the fifth amendment. In the search and seizure
instance, the courts reason that no right of privacy exists as to prop-
erty on which no duty has been paid, and therefore the government
has a primary right to possession of such property." However, the
government cannot be said to have any primary right to a suspect's
admissions of guilt. Therefore, it would seem that customs officers
can have no greater discretion than other police to withhold Mr-
anda-type warnings.
A conviction based on Davis' pre-arrest confession would have
been difficult to sustain, whatever reason the court had chosen.
Further case law, it is submitted, will not support the court's hold-
ing of no custodial interrogation. The United States Attorney's de-
cision not to introduce the defendant's statements at trial"8 is thus
welcomed as a realization that the court's interpretation of Mr-
anda was incorrect 9 It is hoped that other courts will not be mis-
led by the Davis decision.
JOHN A. RITTER
36 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d
870 (9th Cir. 1966); Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cit. 1963), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 920 (1965); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 914 (1957).
87 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886); Corngold v. United States,
367 R2d 1, 15 (9th Cir. 1966). See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965).
88 United States v. Davis, Criminal No. 66-68, W.D. Mass., Dec. 22, 1966.
89 Cf. State v. Silvacarvalho, 180 Neb. 755, 145 N.W.2d 447 (1966), holding
that admissions obtained in violation of Miranda would not vitiate a conviction when
the statements were not introduced into evidence.
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